The paper considers a cooperative differential network game. We assume that at the beginning of the game, players simultaneously and independently choose a neighbor with whom they intend to interact during the game. Each player can choose neighbors from a fixed subset of players. Such subsets can be different for different players, and for each player the number of possible neighbors is fixed. Then, at given time instants, players have the opportunity to change the network. Players create a network to maximize their joint payoff. However, a network that is optimal at the initial time instant may later cease to be optimal. The $C$-core and the Shapley value are considered as solutions of the cooperative game.
Keywords: cooperative communication structures, dynamic network game, Shapley value
Received February 10, 2025
Revised April 7, 2025
Accepted April 14, 2025
Leon Aganesovich Petrosyan, Dr. Phys.-Math. Sci., Prof., St. Petersburg State University, Saint Petersburg, 199034 Russia, e-mail: l.petrosyan@spbu.ru
Yaroslavna Borisovna Pankratova, Cand. Sci. (Phys.-Math.), St. Petersburg State University, Saint Petersburg, 199034 Russia, e-mail: y.pankratova@spbu.ru
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Cite this article as: L.A. Petrosyan, Y.B. Pankratova. Cooperative network games with a changing communication structure. Trudy Instituta Matematiki i Mekhaniki UrO RAN, 2025, vol. 31, no. 2, pp. 195–204.
