A game-theoretic model of pricing in an urban public transport market is considered. It is assumed that the players in the model are transport companies serving urban public transport routes, and the distribution of passengers along the routes is subject to the Hotelling specification. The study focuses on the Nash equilibrium in the pricing game in the transport services market. The results of numerical modeling are presented using the example of the transport system in the city of Petrozavodsk.
Keywords: Nash equilibrium, public transport market, Hotelling specification
Received April 22, 2024
Revised June 12, 2024
Accepted June 17, 2024
Funding Agency: This work was supported by the Russian Science Foundation (project no. 22-11-20015) jointly with the authorities of the Republic of Karelia with financing from the Venture Investment Fund of the Republic of Karelia, https://rscf.ru/project/22-11-20015/.
Vladimir Viktorovich Mazalov, Dr. Phys.-Math. Sci., Prof., Institute of Applied Mathematical Research, Karelian Research Centre of RAS, Petrozavodsk, 185910, Russia, e-mail: vlmazalov@yandex.ru
Elena Nikolaevna Konovalchikova, Cand. Phys.-Math. Sci., Department of Multidisciplinary Scientific, Karelian Research Centre of RAS, Petrozavodsk, 185910, Russia, e-mail: konovalchikova_en@mail.ru
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Cite this article as: V.V. Mazalov, E.N. Konovalchikova. Equilibrium in a pricing model for a public transport market. Trudy Instituta Matematiki i Mekhaniki UrO RAN, 2024, vol. 30, no. 3, pp. 182–190.
